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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
YOSHITARO OKUDA and JACK
ARAMAKI the sole heirs of KIM
ARAMAKI OKUDA, deceased,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 8399
vs.
JERRY A. ROSE,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was instituted by the Plaintiffs and
Appellants, Y oshitaro Okuda and Jack Aramaki, as the
sole heirs of Kim Aramaki Okuda, deceased, who died
in an automobile-pedestrain accident on the 25th -day
of October, 1953. Trial before a jury was had on June
2nd, 1954, in the District Court for Salt Lake County.
The jury returned a verdict against appellants, no cause
of action. A motion for a new trial was duly filed by
appellants. This appeal is prosecuted from the court's
failure to grant the motion for a new trial.
As will b8 not8d from the statement of facts and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from the record, there was no evidence produced in this
case, either direct or circumstantial, as to the conduct of
deceased prror to the impact with defendant's automobile.
Appellants contend that the lower court committed reversible error in two particulars, namely, ( 1) the court
instructed on the various ways in which decedent could
be guilty of contributory negligence when that issue was
not raised by the evidence, and (2) appellants duly requested an instruction ·to the effe:ct that decedent was
presumed to he in the exercise of due care which the
court refused to give.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The auto-pedestrian accident which gave rise to this
action occurred at approximately 2200 South Main Street
in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 25th day of October,
1953, at about 1 :30 A.M.
The deceased, Mrs. Kim Aramaki Okuda, a lady of
Japanese descent was a resident of I-Ielper, Utah. She
had relatives and friends in Salt Lake City, including
her son, one of the appellants, whom she visited on
occasion. She did not speak English. On the evening
that she met death, she had attended a Japanese movie
shown at the Buddhist Church on West First South in
Salt Lake City. After the movie she rode to Magna,
Utah, with her sister, who lived in Magna, and her
sister's son, Saige Aramaki. Saige Aramaki returned the
decedent to Salt Lake City and let her out of his car
on First South between West Temple and First West
Streets. She was staying with friends in that neigh-
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borhood. Mrs. Okuda was not seen alive after that.
The defendant, Jerry A. Rose, a resident of California, but at the time of the accident a resident of
Murray, Utah, was employed as a rate clerk by the
Interstate Motor Lines. He worked irregular hours. On
the Saturday preceding this accident, which occurred
early Sunday morning, he had worked until about noon
and then went home. Sometime during the afternoon
he purchased a pint bottle of 86.4 proof whiskey. He
and his wife drank about Jf2 of the bottle at horne during
the afternoon and early evening. At approximately 9 :00
P.M. the defendant and his wife left their horne in
1\Iurray and came into Salt Lake City to the 11anhattan
Club. They took the pint bottle of "\vhiskey with them
and consumed the remainder of the contents at this
night club. They remained there until it closed at 1 :00

A.M.
After leaving the night club, defendant Rose
traveled south on Main Street to the intersection of 21st
South ancl Nfain Street. l-Ie recalls stopping at that
intersection in response to a red light. (R. 81). He
was in the lane next to the shoulder of the road and
stayed in that lane after leaving the intersection. (R. 81).
The events subsequent to this are most graphically portrayed by the statement of defendant given the investigating officer iinmediately after the aecident (Exhibit
5) . It reads :
"I was driving along south Main Street south
of 21st South when son1ething hit my windshield
immediately after a ear had passed n1e-It (the
3
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object), chipped my windshield and I pulled to
the right-I heard another dull sound and being
in doubt as to what made the sound I stopped
the car and got out to see what the trouble was
- I noticed an object down the road and went to
investigate-I found a woman and various articles
on the road. The woman was injured and I stopped the first car and instructed them to call
Police and ambulance."
/s/ Jerry A. Rose
The body which he found was that of Mrs. Okuda,
who died within a few moments thereafter. There were
no eye-witnesses to the accident. Neither Mr. Rose, the
defendant, nor his wife who was riding with him in the
front seat, saw decedent before the impact. (R. 84, and
125)
The physical facts found at the scene were described
by officers Jackson, Bowden and Vaughn of the South
Salt Lake Police Department and Highway Patrolmen
Nuttal and Cook. The South Salt Lake Officers were in
charge of the investigation and were assisted by the
Highway Patrolmen. (R. 41)
Mrs. Okuda's body had not been moved [as testified
by defendant (R. 86, 87) ] and was found by the officers
about six feet from the sidewalk on the west shoulder of
main Street. (Ex. 1) The shoulder of the road is approximately 15 wide and this would place the body about
9 feet west of the travelled portion of roadway. (Ex.
1). The body was 15 steps north of a sign marked
"entering South Salt Lake." The Rose vehicle was 40
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

steps south of the body and it too was on the shoulder
of the road* (see Ex. 1 vvhich is reproduced herein for
reproduction betvveen pp. 5 & 6, reference). The vehicle
was facing south vvith the front end at a slight angle
tovvard the travelled portion of the roadway. (R. 54)
Definite fabric marks were imprinted on the right
front fender of the vehicle which matched the fabric
of the coat worn by decedent. (R. 39) There was a small
dent in the right front fender of the auto and the right
front hear1light rirn vvas loose (Ex. 4).
Again, the record contains no evidence, direct or
circumstantial, as to the conduct or actions of decedent
before the impact. Based on such absence of fact,
defendant contended that decedent was guilty of contributory negligence and the court instructed on the various ways in which decedent could have been negligent.
That the court erred in this part of its instructions is
the substance of Point I of the argument of this brief.
It is to be noted that the defendant in his statement said
that he found the body on the road. (Ex. 5). He testified that
at no time did his vehicle leave the travelled portion of the roadway and that he stopped on the paved portion of the roadway.
(R. 102) The physical facts show to the contrary that both the
body of Mrs. Okuda and the Rose vehicle were off the roadway
and on the shoulder. Thus, plaintiffs contend, and the jury could
have found, that Mr. Rose turned his vehicle from a travelled
course on a roadway without first ascertaining that such movement could be made with reasonable safety. Certainly, by failing
to see decedent he was guilty of not maintaing a proper lookout.
-x-
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION
NO. 7 PERTAINING TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
POINT II
THE CO,URT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO·. 2 PERTAINING
TO THE PRESUMPTION THAT DECEDENT WAS, AT THE
TIME OF THIS OCCURRENCE, PRESUMED TO BE IN
THE EXERCISE OF DUE CARE.

ARGUl\it:ENT
POINT I
THE CO·URT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION
NO. 7 PERTAINING TO ·CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

The only established fact in this case relative to
the conduct of deceased was that having been struck
by defendant's vehicle she 'vas found about nine feet west
of the travelled portion of the roadway, dying (Ex. 1).
No one observed her n1ovements before the collision.
Defendant admitted that he did not see her until after
the impact (R. 84).
From this state of the evidence the court nonetheless gave its instruction No. 7 pertaining to contributory
negligence which plaintiffs duly excepted to (R. 140).
The instruction reads :
"Instruction No. 7. You are instructed that
the deceased in the exercise of ordinary care, and
in order not to be guilty herself of contributory
negligence, was governed by the following rules
of law at the time and place in question.
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. You are instructed that it was the duty
of the deceased in undertaking to cross the highway, if you should believe that she was so doing,
to keep a reasonable and adequate lookout for
automobiles using the street and to use reasonable
and ordinary care to keep out of the way of such
automobiles. In this connection it was her duty to
look and observe whether there were any automobiles in such close proximity as to affect her
safety and to continue to keep such a reasonable
and prudent lookout as was reasonably necessary
for own protection.
2. You are instructed that if you find from
the evidence that the deceased was crossing the
street at the time of the accident, or was commencing to cross the street and continued on, it was
her duty to exercise ordinary care to ascertain
her surroundings and the vehicles upon the highway at said time and not to ren1ain in a place of
danger, or otherwise fail to exercise reasonable
and ordinary care for her o'vn safety.

3. You are instructed that a pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a
Inarked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection should yield the right of
way to all vehicles lawfully upon the highway.
Therefore, it was the duty of said deceased to
yield the right of way to vehicles upon the street
if you find that she was crossing or commencing to
cross the street under the above circumstances.
4. You are instructed that it is unla,vful for
any person to walk upon a road,vay where sic:evvalks are provided adjacent to the highway.

You are, therefore, instructed that if you find
hy a preponoerance of the PvideneP that the de7
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ceased failed to observe any of the above rules
of law respecting her conduct and that her failure
proximately contributed to the happening of the
collision then and in that event the plaintiffs
herein would not be entitled to recover for her
death."
The Court has stated to the jury in effect that decedent must have maintained a lookout for vehicles,
which if she didn't would constitute negligence; that if
they believed she was crossing the road, not within a
crosswalk, she must yield the right of way and if they
found she was walking along the roadway she must
walk on the sidewalk if there was one.
It is, of course, true, that the jury given facts of
certain behavior may, in view of their own experience,
conclude as a legitimate inference that such behavior
did not amount to ordinary care. The inference, however,
must be based on established fact. It cannot rest on conjecture and surmise. Under instruction No. 7 the jury
was at liberty to find (1) that decedent failed to maintain
a lookout, (2) failed to yield the right of way, and (3)
was walking along the roadway where a sidewalk was
provided and that by doing either of those three things
she was guilty of negligence which would bar a recovery
for her heirs. There is no element of fact in this case
to establish any of the propositions. The jury at best
could merely guess concerning decedent's conduct and
thus the result they reached could not be based on logic
or reason.
They could have, however, been sufficiently impressed with the instruction, to believe that there was
8
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evidence in the record from which they could find that
decedent was negligent. They could believe that there
must have been this evidence in the record or the court
would not have given the instruction. It is for these
reasons that the courts have declared that such abstract
instructions constitute reversible error.

See Corpus Juris Secumdem, Trial, Sec. 379, Vol. 88.
"Instructions should be concrete and specific
as possible with respect to the facts and issues of
the case, and not general or abstract, and it is
improper to give an instruction announcing a
naked legal proposition, however correct it may
be, unless it bears on, and is connected with, the
issues involved, and unless, further, there has
been received some competent evidence to which
the jury may apply it."
This statement of the law is further amplified in
succeeding sections in that volnme and is supported hy
many cases.

Jenson vs. S. H. Kress & Co., 49 P. 2d 968 (Utah).
This was an action for personal injuries sustained
by plaintiff when she somehow received a laceration in
the abdomen caused by a piece of glass from one of the
panels used by defendant on its show cases in its place
of business. There was no evidence to show how the
glass panel became cracked nor how long it had been in
that condition.
In discussing one of the lower court's instructions,
the court said:
"Instruction No. 8 reads: 'In determining
9
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whether the defendant was negligent in maintaining the show case, you may consider the question
whether or not it was cracked or broken, and, if
so, whether or not the defendant knew or by exercise of ordinary care should have known it was
cracked or broken and whether or not the defendant failed to give the plaintiff warning or notice
of such condition; and all the circumstances in
evidence, and from them you should determine
whether or not the defendant was negligent."
"The instruction was erroneous, not exactly
on the ground argued by the defendant, but for
the reason that there is no evidence that the defendant was negligent. Therefore, it was improper to predicate an instruction upon the
theory that the jury might consider certain things
to determine whether the defendant was negligent."
The case was reversed and remanded.
Garrison vs. 1 rowbridge, 177 P. 2d 464 (Mont.).
This was an action for the death of a pedestrian
which occurred at an intersection. After an adverse
verdict the lower court granted a new trial to plaintiff.
Defendant appealed thj s order. In affirming, the appellate court said in part:
"Furthermore, the court erred in giving
instruction No. 15 reading: 'You are instructed
that all traffic, including pedestrians, must, when
they approach an intersection of a city street in
the City of Great Falls, and Second Avenue
North, the same being a through street, stop and
look before entering such intersection for the
purpose of crossing the avenue.' To the giving of
that instruction plaintiff objected upon the
ground 'that there was a con1plete lack of a11y
1
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evidence in the case upon which the giving of such
an instruction can be predicated.' The objection
to the instruction should have been sustained.
There was no evidence showing that deceased
did not stop before entering the intersection. It
is not proper to give an instruction on an issue
concerning which there is no evidence. (53 Am.
Jur. 455)"

JYicCarthy vs. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 Fed. 2nd 877
(CCA 7th).
This \vas a death action brought by the administrator of the estate of deceased who was an engineer
for defendant railroad company. Decedent was killed as
a result of an engine turnover vvhen a journal box
became over-heated. Judgn1ent for defendant and plaintiff appealed. The only issue before the court was
Yvh2ther the trial court properly instructed the jury.
In commenting on the instructions the appellate
court said in part :
"The court further instructed the jury: 'On
the other hand (if you find) that the railroad company, knew at all times the things required of it
by lavv, and that it did not violate the law requiring the use of engines in safe condition, even if
you find the Defendant was negligent and did not
comply "\vith the lavv requiring the use of engines
in good condition, hut that such failure to comply
with the lavv was not the cause of the injury to
and death of the decedent, but that such injury
and death vvere caused solely by his own acts, independently of any negligence on the part of the
Defendant, it would be your duty to find for the
Defendant. But, I have stated, such acts of negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, if yon find
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such acts of negligence, merely contributed to and
were not the sole cause of his death, you should
find for the Plaintiff.' ... Secondly, the instruction is improper because it told the jury that
plaintiff could not recover if his decedent was
guilty of acts of negligence that solely caused his
death. As an abstract proposition of law, that is
correct, but there was no evidence of any independent acts of negligence by the decedent that
were the sole cause of the accident and his death.
The court had instructed on a proposition of law
about which there was no evidence."
The judgment was reversed and a new trial granted.
The case of Olsen vs. W arwood, 255 P. 2d 725 (Utah)
is distinguishable. This was an action for injuries to a
minor child who was injured by the rear wheels of a
school bus after the child had alighted from the bus.
There was evidence that the bus had stopped; and that
the driver had observed the minor plaintiff a good five
feet from the bus before the vehicle was put back in
motion. The court held that this evidence was sufficient
for a jury to infer that plaintiff had walked or run
toward the bus after disembarking and it was not error
for the court to instruct in that regard.
The court announces the general rule to be, however,
as follows:
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that an
instruction must be based on evidence, and that
it is prejudicial error to submit a charged act
of negligence to a jury for its consideration in
the absence of evidence tending to support a
finding that the act occurred. Smith vs. Clark,
37 Utah 116, 106 P. 653, 26 L.R.A., N.S., 953, and
12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

see Griffin vs. Prudential Ins. Co., 102 Utah 563,
133 P. 2d 333, 144 A.L.R. 1402; Kendall vs. Fordham, 79 Utah 256, 9 P. 2d 183. Likewise it is well
settled that the court may not permit the jury
to speculate upon the evidence and that a finding
of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjecture,
guess, or speculation. Jackson vs. Colston, 116
Utah 205, 209 P. 2d 566; Dern Inv. Co. vs. Carbon
County Land Co., 94 Utah 76, 75 P. 2d 660.
The general proposition of law set forth in the
Olsen case, supra, is applicable to the case at bar. Here,
there is no evidence of decedent's conduct (as there was
in the Olsen case) prior to the fatal collision. Yet, the
jury was allowed to guess that decedent was crossing the
street; that she did not maintain a proper lookout; that
she failed to yield the right of "\vay.
The error is doubly serious when one considers that
the plaintiffs were deprived of the presumption of due
care by the court's refusal to instruct on that point.
That the court erred in instructing on the presumption that deceased "\Vas in the c'xercise of due rare is the
subject of Point II of this argument.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 PERTAINING
TO THE PRESUMPTION THAT DECEDENT WAS, AT THE
TIME OF THIS OCCURRENCE, PRESUMED TO BE IN
THE EXERCISE OF DUE CARE.

As has heretofore been shown, there was no evidence
produced at trial relative to the acts and conduct of
deceased immediately before the impact. The only per13
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son who had an opportunity to observe decedent (and
negligently failed to do so), defendant, Jerry A. Rose, admitted that he did not see her before his vehicle struck
her. There was no testimony to indicate where decedent
was when struck. The physical evidence found was
merely personal effects found near the body. There was
no evidence of any scuff marks, skid marks or other signs
of an impact on the travelled portion of the roadway.
This absence of fact demands the giving of an instruction to the effect that decedent was presumed to
have been in the exercise of due care. Appellants requested such an instruction and duly excepted to the
court's refusal to give it (R. 168 and 141).
The problem thus raised in regard to the presumption that a deceased person is presu1ned to have been
exercising due care has been dealt with by the Utah
Supreme Court in three recent cases. Tuttle vs. P.I.E .,
242 P. 2d 764, Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 249 P. 2d 213 and
Mecham vs. Allen, 262 P. 2d 285.
We conceive the doctrine of those cases to be that
a deceased person is presumed to be in the exercise of
due care (the presumed fact) which presumption arises
from the fact that a person has been accidentally killed
(the basic fact). The basic fact, of course, remains in the
case. The presumed fact remains in the case until the
party who has the burden of proving the non-existence
of the presumed fact produces prima facie evidence to
the contrary. If that burden is not discharged, the presumed fact remains in the case and the court should
instruct the jury upon it.
14
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See Justice Wade's concurring opinion in the Gibbs
case, supra, footnote 1, at page 217:
"A presumption is merely a rule of law requiring the trier of the facts to assume one fact
from proof of another fact or set of facts. This
kind of a presumption merely places on the disfavored party the burden of going forward \vith
the evidence; it is completely nullified upon the
production of prima facie evidence to the contrary.
In the absence of such contrary evidence, the
court should direct the jury to assume the presumed fact. The judge and not the jury determines when the evidence is sufficient and when
he concludes that it is, he submits the issue of fact
which would otherwise be presumed to the jury
to be determined from the evidence along with
the other facts without mentioning the presumption."
A somewhat similar rule has been developed by the
court in California, beginning with JJI ar Shee vs. I~ a ryland Assurance Corporation, Baltimore, 210 P. 269,
(Calif.). A later case stating and applying the rule
of the Mar Shee case to a negligence action is West berg
~90 .
"\"' s. TV z..'7flc e' 94 p . '),l u.
n

._.q

"We think it well to state here that in our
opinion there is a substantial difference in the
situation before a court where the question of the
plaintiff's negligence is in issue, and both plaintiff
and his witnesses testified to all his acts and
conduct at the time of his alleged negligence, fron1
a situation \vhere the acts and conduct of a decedent are the issues before the eourt. In the first
instance, all possible facts both in favor of and
against the alleged negligence of the plaintiff
are before the eonrt, anrl it is difficult for us

15
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to preceive how any presumption as to his conduct
can add to or detract from this evidence. Surely
if this evidence conclusively supports the claiin
that he was negligent, then, according to our
decisions cited above, the presumption as to his
conduct has been dispelled. On the other hand,
if the plaintiff has testified respecting his acts
and conduct, and his testimony and that of his
witnesses showed that he used ordinary care
for his safety, and instruction to that effect would
not be of any assistance to him; but if such evidence did not clearly and unmistakably clear him
of the charge of negligence, then an instruction
which would place his testimony in a more favorable light than it would be without such instruction would seem to be uncalled for, if not improper. In such a case the giving of any instruction as to the presumption of plaintiff's conduct
would seem to be of doubtful propiety. It has,
however, been held that the giving of such an
instruction under the circu1nstances just related
was not prejudicial. (Citing cases.) But in the
other situation, where the acts and conduct of a
deceased person are the subject of inquiry, and
the testimony respecting such acts and conduct
necessarily must be produced by witnesses other
than deceased, unless such testimony meets the
requirement of the rule in the Mar Shee case, and
other cases decided by this court folloWing the
Mar Shee ease, an instruction that the deceased
is presumed to have exercised ordinary care of
his own concerns is not only proper but this court
in an unbroken line of decisions, has sustained the
giving of such an instruction."
The precise question in this case is whether it can
be said that prima facie evidence of contributory negli-
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gence was produced by defendant. The record is silent
on the subject. There was no testimony on the subject
of decedent's conduct and the physical facts found at
the scene do not aid the defendant in establishing contributory negligence, but rather, tend to indicate just
the opposite. Can it be said then, that the court correctly
found a prima facie case made out and correctly refused
to instruct the jury on the presumption. The answer is
no. The presumed fact remained in the case from beginning to end and it was prejudicial error for the court
to refuse to instruct the jury thereon.
CONCLUSION
The instruction on contributory negligence in this
case gave the defendant the benefit of the doctrine
without requiring him to produce evidence on this point.
The jury could then speculate that decedent failed to
maintain a proper lookout or that she was crossing
the roadway and failed to yield the right of way or
they could guess that she was not crossing the roadway
but rather was walking along side the road in an area
where sidewalks are provided which was a violation of
law and would be negligence. The instruction was clearly
error for this reason and plaintiffs' urge that upon a
retrial of this case, unless evidence of contributory negligence is produced, this issue, "\vhich is foreign to the
evidence, be eliminated.
Equally important is the court's failure to instruct
the jury that deceased was presumed to be in the exercise
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of due care. There was no evidence to the contrary and
that being the case, the presumption remains in the case
from beginning to end. It was error for the court to fail
to instruct on it.
For these two reasons, both of which are vital, plaintiffs urge the court to grant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD M. GARRETT
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
App~ellants

511 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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